Inequalities: Income, Wealth and consumption by Boyer, Marcel
 
 
1 
 
INEQUALITIES:  
INCOME, WEALTH AND CONSUMPTION 
Marcel Boyer* Ph.D., O.C., FRSC 
Emeritus Professor of Economics, Université de Montréal 
Associate Member, Toulouse School of Economics 
2020-04 
Plan 
1. Introduction: Inequalities, The Research Program 
2. Income and Wealth Inequality: An Historical Perspective 
3. Measuring Consumption Inequality: Challenges and Pitfalls  
4. Adjusted Disposable Income, Consumption (HFCE, HAFC) and Savings 
5. Conclusion  
 
Abstract: I consider as misplaced the current emphasis on income and wealth inequalities as compared to the 
socially more relevant consumption inequalities, which have been significantly reduced over the last decades and 
most likely for a much longer period of time. One important factor has been the development of social transfers in 
kind which add significant resources to the lowest income quintile as compared to the highest quintile. I present the 
main characteristics of developments of income and wealth inequalities over time (since 1920): The share of the 
top 1% of earners followed a downward trend until the 1970-79 decade, and an upward trend afterwards, reaching 
in the 2010-19 decade a level similar to that of the 1920-29 decade. The share of the top 10% of earners followed a 
similar movement. The same picture is observed for wealth inequality. Similar increases in income inequality over 
the last four decades are also observed in music and sports.  
Keywords: Income Inequalities, Consumption inequalities 
 
Résumé : Je considère regrettable l'accent mis actuellement sur les inégalités de revenus et de richesse par rapport 
aux inégalités de consommation socialement plus pertinentes et considérablement réduites au cours des dernières 
décennies et plus. Un facteur important a été le développement des transferts sociaux en nature qui ajoutent des 
ressources importantes au quintile inférieur de revenu comparativement au quintile supérieur. Je présente les 
principales caractéristiques de l'évolution des inégalités de revenu et de richesse depuis 1920 : la part du 1% plus 
riche a suivi une tendance à la baisse jusqu'à la décennie 1970-79, puis une tendance à la hausse par la suite, 
atteignant en 2010-19 un niveau similaire à celui de la décennie 1920-29. La part du 10% plus riche a suivi un 
mouvement similaire. On observe un portrait similaire pour l'inégalité de richesse. Au cours des quatre dernières 
décennies, on observe des augmentations similaires de l'inégalité des revenus dans la musique et les sports.  
Mots-clés : Inégalités de revenus, Inégalité de consommation 
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1. Introduction: Inequalities, the Research Program  
The question of inequalities in society, their determining factors, and their evolution over time is a 
recurring theme of significant research efforts in academia and public policy circles. Together with 
calls for the reform of capitalism, it is a theme that attracts lots of discussions in public opinion 
pages of newspapers and magazines and social media platforms. 
This paper presents the main characteristics of developments of income and wealth inequalities over 
time (since 1920), but it challenges the current emphasis on such inequalities as compared to the 
socially more relevant consumption inequalities, which have been significantly reduced over the last 
decades and most likely for a much longer period of time. 
The level of inequality in income and wealth decreased between 1920 and 1980 but increased 
between 1980 and today with late signs of reversion, while inequality in consumption, arguably the 
most important form of inequality, has most likely decreased over that period, although data on a 
reasonably encompassing measure of consumption are lacking. However, we begin to have such a 
measure for a period covering the last two decades, with Statistics Canada at the forefront of those 
developments.  
This is the second of three papers on inequalities. The first paper1 discussed the relative 
compensation of CEOs, a central focus of discussions on inequalities. Based on data for 500 of the 
largest corporations compiled by Bloomberg (S&P500 firms) from SEC filings by firms (Table 1), 
we obtain that the CEOs of those large companies earned an average 14.2 million US$ and a median 
$12.4 million US$ in 2018-19. The CEO pay ratio, defined as the firm’s CEO pay over the firm’s 
median employee salary, reached 281 this last year for the S&P500 firms. However, firms greatly 
differ in size and more representative ratios are the median CEO pay ratio of 170 and the weighted 
average CEO pay ratio (measured as the total paid to all CEOs divided by the total of all median 
salaries over all 500 firms) of 185. Although media coverage reports mainly the 281 ratio, it may 
not be the most informative and relevant measure of the discrepancy between the CEO pay and the 
median pay in the firm. 
Each of the 26 million employees in those 500 firms “contributes” on average $273 to the annual 
pay of their CEO, or about one half of one percent of their respective salary. Seen differently, if we 
                                                           
1 Marcel Boyer (2019), “CEO Pay in Perspective”, CIRANO 2019s-33 and Toulouse School of Economics WP 1059, 
52p. http://www.cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2019s-33.pdf   
https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/wp/2019/wp_tse_1059.pdf 
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were to divide the CEO pay equally among all employees, the resulting employee annual pay 
increase would be $273. If we do it proportionately to the employee salary, the resulting employee 
pay increase would be one half of one percent (0.50%).   
As expected, those measures, namely the CEO pay ratio, the CEO pay per employee, and the B-
ratio vary across firms and industries. There are different reasons for this variability, including how 
critical and specific the role and importance or impact of the CEO leadership and competencies in 
the design, implementation, and management of the firm strategies and actions. In general, the CEO-
led exercise of the firm’s underlying real options have significant impacts on the performance, 
profitability, and growth of the firm and, in so doing, on the overall well-being of employees, 
shareholders, and other stakeholders, including suppliers and clients. But this CEO role and 
importance may differ across firms and industries as well as across countries. Understanding how 
and why is therefore essential.  
The third (forthcoming) paper of the trilogy is “The Social Role of Inequalities: Why significant 
inequality levels in income and wealth are important for our prosperity and collective wellbeing”. 
It will deal with the social role of inequalities in income and wealth. I show that inequalities in 
income and wealth may be understood as meeting three related incentive-based social needs or 
imperatives, namely the need to ensure a proper level of savings and investments, the need to allow 
proper creative destruction through innovation, and the need to induce the proper but individually 
costly development and acquisition of new competencies. Those three factors or social needs, which 
require some (optimal) level of income and wealth inequality, are favoring increased levels of 
productivity, economic growth, and prosperity for all. 
I develop in this forthcoming paper the nature of these three factors or social imperatives. I define 
the social role of the higher income and wealth groups as “Save and Invest”. This social role of the 
rich may have become more important in recent decades, say the last four since 1980. But who 
among all of us as candidates should be given this role, which comes with responsibilities but also 
with significant advantages?   
2. Income and Wealth Inequality: An Historical Perspective   
Since Atkinson and Harrison (1978) and Piketty and Saez (2003) articles on the historic perspective 
on inequality, the interest has been revived and the subject has seen a large influx of studies. The 
large majority of those studies have dealt with income and wealth distributions. More recently, some 
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authors attempted to characterize with a mitigated success the consumption inequality question (see 
below).  
Chancel (2019)2 present ten facts about income and wealth inequality measures and the trend 
associated with them. An important caveat is that it is hard to disentangle and measure different 
measures and expressions of inequality because of its complex nature and the many shapes it can 
take. Chancel’s ten facts are the following. 
The data available to measure inequality is scarce and the quality is often questionable. Across 
countries and over time, comparability between measures of income and wealth inequality is lacking 
as surveys have multiple limitations, especially at the top of the distribution. While tax data is in 
general better, the tax code is different between countries and exclusions/inclusions are not always 
perfectly matched. There is also the issue of the missing sources of information. Whereas some 
work is made towards reconciling both types of data, it is just in its infancy. 
After 1980, income inequality started to rise, after a prolonged decline, albeit at different speeds 
across countries. The top 1% of earners went from capturing 17-20% of national income in the early 
1900s to 8% in the 1970s and 1980s to 10%-20% as of today (see Figure 1). According to Chancel, 
the pre-1980 decline was probably due to the fall of capital incomes (Piketty and Saez 2003). 
Osberg (2018)3 writes: “The income share of the top one per cent in Canada and the United States 
was very high in the 1920s, fell abruptly during the 1940s and then edged down marginally during 
the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Since the 1980s, however, there has been a clear long-run trend upward 
in the income share of the top one per cent (with ups and downs around this trend during booms and 
recessions).”    
Advanced economies have become richer, but the relative size of the government has been 
diminishing. There has been a transition of public wealth ownership to private wealth: in the 1970s, 
net private wealth (all assets net of debt detained by private actors) over national income ratios were 
about 200-300% and have soared to 400-600% recently. Conversely, net public wealth (all assets 
minus debt detained by governments) over national income ratios went from 50% to 100% in the 
1970s to an average of 0% recently in most developed countries. Negative public wealth implies 
that debt is higher than assets (which means that the wealth is owned by private owners). 
                                                           
2 Lucas Chancel (2019), “Ten Facts About Inequality in Advanced Economies”, WID.world working paper 2019/15.  
3 Lars Osbeg (2018), The Age of Increasing Inequality: The Astonishing Rise of Canada’s 1%, Lorimer and Company, 
Toronto. 
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Capital is back at the top of the distribution. Wealth concentration is back to the level observed at 
the beginning of the 20th century, although the situation has been less dramatic in Western Europe, 
which experienced a larger decline in wealth concentration followed by a smaller increase since the 
1980s. Also, growth of wealth (through return on capital) has been higher for the top (8,9%) than 
for the average (2,7%). Average incomes only grew at an average of 1% per year. Savings rate 
display a similar pattern. For the top 1%, the savings rate went from 30% to 35%, while for the next 
9%, it went from 30% to 15%. For the bottom 90%, it went from 10% to 0%. 
The Great recession has not stopped the trend of income and wealth inequality growth in most 
advanced economies. Top income and wealth shares fell during the recession but came back to the 
same level as before and even higher in some countries. For income, the situation has been much 
more nuanced. 
The nature of inequality has changed: it is more about class than about the nationality. Income 
distributions in advanced economies are more in line with the global inequality spectrum. 
There is a link between high inequality and low mobility. For Scandinavian countries, with a top 
10% income share of 25-30%, the intergenerational income/earnings elasticity4 is low at 0,15-0,2 
indicating a relatively mobile society. In the US, where the share is 45%, the elasticity is 0,5 
indicting a relatively low mobility society. This relationship, called the “Great Gatsby curve”,5 
represents the fact that high inequality does not pave the way to a higher intergenerational mobility 
(which one might assume in theory). 
While racial and gender income gaps were greatly reduced in the 20th century, they remain high 
even today. The workforce participation of women has risen in the past decades (it is now over 46% 
in most advanced countries). This has resulted in a significant reduction in income inequalities 
between genders, and it has reduced inequality across the entire population. However, since the 
1980s, the total income gap was not significantly reduced. The pre-tax income ratio was reduced 
from 250-200% in the 1980s to about 180% in 2014. For full-time workers, the decrease has been a 
little bit steeper, from a ratio of 170% to a ratio of 130% in 2014 (differences in occupation and 
                                                           
4 The intergenerational elasticity measures the percentage change in children income over the percentage change in 
parent income, measured by the income of children and parents at the main stage of the respective lifecycle. For 
Canada, a recent estimate is 0.32 (Wen-Hao Chen, Yuri Ostrovsky and Patrizio Piraino 2016, “Intergenerational 
Income Transmission: New Evidence from Canada,” Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series 11F0019M No. 
379, Statistics Canada), somewhat higher than the previous one of 0.2 (Miles Corak and Andrew Heisz 1999, “The 
Intergenerational Earnings and Income Mobility of Canadian Men: Evidence from Longitudinal Income Tax Data,” 
The Journal of Human Resources 34 (3): 504–533).  
5 The expression “Great Gatsby Curve” (2012) is from the late Alan Krueger, former Chairman of the U.S. Council of 
Economic Advisers. 
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industries could represent up to 50% of the pay gap of full-time workers in the US). Also, women 
are underrepresented at the top of the distribution: only about 25% of the top 10% are women and 
the representation is worse in the higher end of the distribution (10% of top 0,1%). 
The racial wealth inequalities have also decreased (especially in the second half of the 20th century: 
white/black earnings ratio was 250% in the 1960s and 130% in the 1980s). Since then, no further 
decrease in disparities happened and wealth disparities have increased. The wealth gap used to be 
around 500-600% but is now over 700%. 
Accessibility to education, health and high-salary jobs tend to reduce the disadvantages of the 
individuals at the bottom of the distribution. Since technological change and the globalization are 
key factors of the increase in income and wealth inequality in rich countries (often called « superstar 
effect », where the access to a larger market means that a skilled individual might set themselves 
apart even more), highly skilled workers tend to have benefited from this factor. The supply of skills 
must increase through education to match demand increase.  
The impact of education on future inequalities is high. While tax policies are important, pre-tax 
income inequality often mirrors post-tax inequality, which means that focusing on social policies 
might be more effective than focusing on the tax code. For example, Scandinavian countries and 
most Western European countries have more socially oriented policies and are amongst the 
countries with the lowest income disparities. They are also the countries associated with public 
health systems.  
In the US, there is a 14-year life expectancy gap between the top 1% and the bottom 1%, which 
suggests poor health at the bottom of the distribution (resulting in reduced productivity and mobility, 
accentuating inequalities). Those inequalities are not seen in countries with universal public access 
to healthcare. 
Minimum wage is also a lot higher in proportion to the average income than it is in the US. It might 
be due to the importance of unions which is correlated with pre-tax income inequality. 
These different impacts suggest that the trade growth or the technological changes might not have 
been the main factors to explain the rising trend in inequality. 
Tax policies are still important (progressiveness), especially at the top of the income distribution. 
After the 1970s, top tax rates were greatly reduced, and pre-tax income shares grew across both rich 
and emerging countries. The figure below, which presents average federal, state and local tax rate 
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by pretax income group in the US between 1950 and 2018 (Source. Lucas Chancel 2019, Appendix 
Figure 15), shows that tax rates have increased by an average of five percentage points, except for 
the 99th percentile, for which rates have dropped significantly.  
 
 
 
Effective taxation for the top 0,01% went from 50% in the 1950s to less than 40% after the 1980s. 
For the top 400 in the US, it declined from 60% in the 1960s to about 30% more recently (which is 
less than the rest of the population in proportion paid). Fall in corporate taxation increased the 
alternative compensations of CEOs. This reduction was also accompanied by a rise of the middle-
class tax rate. 
Other factors might also explain and drive trends in income and wealth inequality in the future, such 
as automation, artificial intelligence, biogenetic, climate change. Regarding the last factor, Chancel 
states that carbon taxes are inherently regressive. But given that carbon taxes are environmental 
prices, their regressivity is not surprising as all prices of all goods and services, seen from a taxation 
viewpoint, are in a way regressive. 
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The following figure is from The Economist (13th April 2019). It compares pre-tax Gini coefficient 
to after-tax Gini coefficient to show how taxes and transfers affect the redistribution of income: The 
difference between the two measures reflects approximately how progressive the system of taxes 
and transfers is in each country. Since the pre-tax Gini coefficient is high for the United States, it 
must redistribute more than most countries to have low after-tax income inequality. On the other 
hand, South Korea must do less to achieve low income inequality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Also, the after-tax measure is strongly correlated with the size of the government (share of GDP). 
While France and the United States have close levels of income inequality before taxes, after-tax 
inequality of France is lower than the United States. The respective shares of GDP of their 
government are 57% and 35%. For Ireland, the change in the coefficient is the highest, because 
income taxes are high (while corporate taxes, which represent most of the tax revenue, are low). 
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Tables 1 to 4 show that income and wealth inequalities in Canada, France, the UK and the USA 
generally decreased from the early 1920 till 1980 and increased afterwards.  
For Canada (Table 1), we observe that the income share of the top 1% of earners followed a 
downward trend until the 1970-79 decade, and an upward trend afterwards, reaching in the 2010-19 
decade a level similar to that of the 1920-29 decade. The share of the top 10% of earners followed 
a similar movement.   
Table 1: Pre-tax income shares – decadal averages (Canada) 
(WID - World Inequality Database https://wid.world/data/ 21-09-2019; 
Note that the last decade has missing entries.) 
 
Income share  
of the top 10% 
 
Income share 
of the top 1% 
 
1920-1929  
 
    14,9% 
 
1930-1939   17,2%  
1940-1949 38,8%  11,3%  
1950-1959 37,7%  10,0%  
1960-1969 37,7%  9,3%  
1970-1979 37,2%  8,6%  
1980-1989 36,7%  9,4%  
1990-1999 39,0%  11,5%  
2000-2009 41,4%  14,2%  
2010-2019  41,4%  13,6%  
  
 
 
  
Variations decade over decade 
 
 
1920-1929  
 
 
 
1930-1939   15,4%  
1940-1949   -34,3%  
1950-1959        -3,0%  -11,4%  
1960-1969        -0,1%  -7,3%  
1970-1979        -1,2%  -6,8%  
1980-1989        -1,4%  9,1%  
1990-1999         6,3%  21,6%  
2000-2009         6,1%  24,2%  
2010-2019          0,0%  -4,4%  
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For France (Table 2), we observe that the income shares of the top 1% of earners followed a 
downward trend until the 1980-89 decade and an upward trend afterwards, without reaching in the 
2010-16 period a level similar to that of the 1920-29 and 1930-39 decades. The share of the top 10% 
followed a similar movement if less pronounced. As for wealth distribution, we observe similar 
trends, a reduction in the top 1% and the top 10% wealth shares between 1920 and 1990 followed 
by an upward trend.  
 Table 2: Pre-tax income shares – decadal averages (France) 
(WID - World Inequality Database https://wid.world/data/ 21-09-2019; 
Note that the last decade has missing entries.) 
Period Income shares 
top 10% 
Income shares 
top 1%  
Wealth shares top 
10%  
Wealth shares 
top 1%  
 
1920-1929 47,0% 20,9% 80,3% 47,8% 
1930-1939 44,8% 17,2% 77,3% 43,9% 
1940-1949 35,7% 11,9% 72,6% 34,2% 
1950-1959 35,6% 10,9% 70,9% 32,0% 
1960-1969 36,9% 10,8% 68,0% 29,6% 
1970-1979 32,8% 9,2% 55,2% 18,9% 
1980-1989 30,8% 8,2% 50,5% 16,7% 
1990-1999 32,1% 9,6% 52,8% 21,4% 
2000-2009 33,2% 11,2% 54,1% 23,9% 
2010-2016 32,7% 10,9% 55,1% 23,0% 
 
 
Variations decade over decade 
 
1920-1929     
1930-1939 -4,6% -17,8% -3,8% -8,3% 
1940-1949 -20,3% -30,8% -6,1% -22,1% 
1950-1959 -0,3% -8,5% -2,3% -6,4% 
1960-1969 3,4% -0,9% -4,1% -7,5% 
1970-1979 -10,9% -14,6% -18,9% -36,2% 
1980-1989 -6,2% -10,7% -8,4% -11,6% 
1990-1999 4,2% 16,9% 4,5% 28,1% 
2000-2009 3,5% 16,7% 2,4% 12,0% 
     2010-2016 -1,8%        -3,4% 2,0%            -3,8% 
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For the UK (Table 3), data on income inequality are missing before 1980. From 1980 till today, the 
trend is positive and the shares of the top 1% and the top 10% of income earners are increasing. As 
for wealth distribution, we observe a negative trend in the top 1% and the top 10% wealth shares 
between 1920 and 1990 followed by an upward trend. 
Table 3: Pre-tax income shares – decadal averages (UK) 
(WID - World Inequality Database https://wid.world/data/ 21-09-2019; 
Note that the last decade has missing entries.) 
Period Income shares 
top 10% 
Income shares 
top 1%  
Wealth shares top 
10%  
Wealth shares top 
1%  
 
1920-1929    87,8% 58,8% 
1930-1939    85,6% 54,0% 
1940-1949    83,0% 46,6% 
1950-1959    75,5% 38,7% 
1960-1969    67,7% 31,5% 
1970-1979    60,8% 23,8% 
1980-1989 29,9%        7,3%   49,8%    16,7% 
1990-1999 32,3%  9,0%   48,8%    17,6% 
2000-2009 34,6% 11,4%   51,3%    18,8% 
2010-2016 33,6% 11,2%   51,9%    19,9% 
  
 Variations decade over decade 
 
1920-1929     
1930-1939   -2,5% -8,2% 
1940-1949   -3,0% -13,7% 
1950-1959   -9,1% -16,9% 
1960-1969   -10,3% -18,8% 
1970-1979   -10,1% -24,2% 
1980-1989   -18,1% -30,1% 
1990-1999 7,7% 23,6% -2,1% 5,8% 
2000-2009 7,2% 26,7% 5,2% 6,6% 
2010-2016 -2,8% -1,7% 1,2% 5,9% 
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For the USA (Table 4), we observe that the income shares, measured in the WID database, of the 
top 1% and the top 10% of earners followed a downward trend until the 1970-79 decade and an 
upward trend afterwards, reaching in the 2010-16 period a level similar to that of the 1920-29 
decade. The corrections proposed by Geloso et al. (2020) reduce the USA pre-1950 income 
inequality but do not change the picture in a significant way. As for the wealth distribution, we 
observe similar trends, a reduction in the top 1% and the top 10% wealth shares between 1920 and 
1980 or 1990, followed by an upward trend to a level just below the level of the 1920-29 decade. 
Table 4: Pre-tax income and wealth shares – decadal averages (USA) 
(WID - World Inequality Database https://wid.world/data/ 21-09-2019) 
(Geloso: Geloso, Magness, Moore, Schlosser, EJ 2020) 
Period 
Income shares 
top 10% 
 WID     Geloso 
Income shares 
top 1%  
  WID     Geloso 
Wealth shares top 
10%  
 
Wealth shares top 
1% 
  
 
1920-1929 46,0%     39,0%     19,3%    15,9% 81,5% 41,0% 
1930-1939 46,8%     37,6%     17,1%    13,5% 82,6% 40,9% 
1940-1949 39,6%     34,5%     16,3%    10,8% 71,9% 31,9% 
1950-1959 36,5%     13,8% 68,4% 27,6% 
1960-1969 35,7%     12,4% 70,1% 28,3% 
1970-1979 34,5%     10,8% 66,5% 24,1% 
1980-1989 36,4%     12,4% 62,5% 24,3% 
1990-1999 40,7%     15,5% 65,7% 29,0% 
2000-2009 44,3%     18,6% 69,0% 33,4% 
2010-2016 46,4%     20,0% 73,6% 38,4% 
 
*the last decade has missing entries.  
    
Variations decade over decade 
 
1920-1929    
1930-1939   1,7%    -11,4% 1,4% -0,1% 
1940-1949 -15,3%     -4,3% -12,9% -22,1% 
1950-1959  -8,0%    -15,5% -4,9% -13,3% 
1960-1969  -2,0%    -10,1% 2,5% 2,4% 
1970-1979  -3,5%    -12,9% -5,1% -14,6% 
1980-1989   5,6%     15,1% -6,0% 0,8% 
1990-1999  11,7%     24,8% 5,2% 19,1% 
2000-2009   8,8%     19,5% 5,0% 15,2% 
2010-2016   4,9%      7,8% 6,7% 15,1% 
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Geloso (2019)6 claim that most studies treat inequality as an aggregate, while it comes from many 
subcomponents. The general narrative is that inequality in the US plummeted from the late 19th 
century to the 1960s and then started to rise after 1975 (in between those years, inequality seems to 
have plateaued). What different authors have called « The great-levelling » (convergence of shares 
of income) comes down to multiple factors, such as geography, gender and ethnic gaps, 
immigration, and much more.  
Overall, the main writers on the subject, such as Piketty, have argued that inequality fell because of 
the rise of the welfare state. While it could have played its part, Geloso notes that a lot of the 
government decisions were regressive (Jim Crow laws, taxes that the blacks were forced to pay even 
if they were not benefiting from social programs, etc.). Evidence is not so clear also after 1970, 
when government spending was high and redistributive policies were flourishing, but inequality was 
on a rising trajectory. He also disagrees with Piketty’s view that the reason behind the rise in 
inequality was due to the fact that return on capital was higher than the growth rate, which would in 
turn imply higher revenue growth for the rich. 
Geloso attributes the fall and the rise of inequality to the following factors instead: immigration, 
relative factor price, discrimination, regulation, international trade, urbanization, labour force 
participation, skill-biased technological change, market integration, etc. Before the 1970s, 
inequality measures are based on tax data, which is sensitive to the problem of tax evasion. Thus, 
those measures would be understating inequality in this period.  
Also, the income gap between whites and blacks was very large. Throughout the 20th century, 
blacks started migrating from the South to the North of the United States, making regions more 
homogeneous (reducing inequality). For example, the income ratio (blacks/whites) increased from 
25% to 40% by 1940 and to 55% by 1970. The income gap between men and women fell too, mostly 
because of technological reasons which made work more accessible for women (contraception, 
running water, appliances, and many others). Immigration restrictions during this period also played 
a major role in bringing down inequality, since immigration is inequality inducing by definition (if 
an individual diverges from the median, he increases inequality). The fact that the share of 
                                                           
6 Vincent Geloso (2019), “The Fall and Rise of Inequality: Disaggregating Narratives”, chapter 10 in Austrian Economics: The Next 
Generation, Advances in Austrian Economics, Volume 23, 161–175 (Emerald Publishing Limited). 
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immigrants in the entire population fell from 13,2% to 4,7% between 1920 to 1970 convinces 
Geloso that this effect has been considerable. 
After 1970, except for shrinking gender differences (more accessibility to enter the workforce), most 
factors reversed in trends, and started contributing towards a rise in inequality. For example, the 
immigration share went up, regional differences too, which is mostly related to different price 
variations between groups. While controversial, the income gap between whites and blacks might 
have started to rise, but surveys may not paint an accurate representation, since they skim the 
population in prison, which earns mostly nothing. Housing and zoning laws are another suggestion, 
since owners are benefiting from a rent increase while renters have a larger share of their income 
dedicated to rent as limiting supply increases prices. Since renters tend to be in the lower end of the 
distribution and owners on the higher end, this could have resulted in an increase in inequality.  
All in all, it is important when analyzing inequality to look not only at aggregated measures, but 
also at measures that include micro foundations to avoid broad statements that could miss the true 
nature of inequality. However, the general U-shape movement in income and wealth inequality 
appear to resist to criticisms although the exact curvature remains at issue.   
Figure 1 illustrates the U-shape curve of the top 1% national income share across the world. And 
Figure 2 illustrates quite clearly the U-shape curve of the top 1% personal wealth share in rich 
countries. As for Figure 3, it illustrates the income growth between 1980 and 2015 in France and 
the USA for different income groups. The analysis of the  income growth will be developed in the 
third paper of the trilogy (“The Social Role of Inequalities: Why significant inequality levels in 
income and wealth are important for our prosperity and collective wellbeing”).
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Figure 1: Income (pretax NI per adult) inequality U-shape curve over time 
Top 1% national income share across the world, 1900-2018 
(Source. Lucas Chancel 2019, Figure 3; Western Europe is the average of France, UK, Germany and Sweden) 
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Figure 2: Wealth inequality U-shape curve over time  
Top 1% personal wealth share in rich countries, 1915-2014 
(Source. Lucas Chancel 2019, Figure 6) 
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Figure 3: Income growth in France and the US, 1980-2017 
 (Source. Lucas Chancel 2019, Appendix Figure 7) 
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The effect of taxes 
 
One expects that the effect of taxes and transfers will be to reduce income inequalities. Indeed, taxes 
do so in a significant way. The next figure and table shed light on this reality and the information 
they contain complements the information conveyed in the previous figures.  
The first figure shows the effect of taxes and transfers on the ratio of the top 10% to the bottom 50% 
average income in four non-intersecting regions of Europe. We observe that “pre-tax and transfers” 
inequality, measured by the [(top 10%) / (bottom 50%)] ratio is higher in Western Europe than in 
the other regions. However, the effect of taxes and transfers is more important in Western Europe 
as it translates into a reduction of 29% in the ratio, compared to 15% for Eastern Europe, 23% for 
Southern Europe, and 23% for Northern Europe. Post-taxes and transfers income inequality 
becomes lower in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe but remains higher than in Southern 
Europe and Northern Europe.     
 
Figure 4: Pre-tax/transfers vs. Post-tax/transfers income inequality in Europe, 2017 
(Source. Thomas Blanchet, Lucas Chancel, Amory Gethin 2019, Figure 20) 
The boxed percentages represent the reduction in inequality due to the tax and transfer systems 
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Table 5 indicates that for Canada, the progressivity of taxation has increased between 1999 and 
2018. We observe that the shares of total taxes paid by the highest quintile have increased while 
that of the lowest quintile has decreased. The ratio of shares [(highest quintile) / (lowest quintile)] 
has increased from 41.3 to 53.9, which means that the top 20% of income earners pays in 2018 
close to 54 times more taxes than the bottom 20% of income earners, while it was 41 times in 
1999.  
Table 5: Share (%) of taxes paid per quintile7 
Canada 1999-2017 
 
Lowest 
quintile 
Second 
quintile  
Third      
quintile 
Fourth 
quintile 
Highest 
quintile 
Ratio 
highest/lowest 
       
1999 1.3 6.2 14.1 22.9 55.5 41.3 
2000 2.1 6.4 13.8 22.3 55.5 26.9 
2001 1.1 6.1 13.7 22.2 56.8 52.9 
2002 1.3 6.3 13.3 22.1 57.0 43.6 
2003 1.2 6.1 13.5 22.6 56.6 47.4 
2004 1.1 5.9 13.4 22.3 57.4 54.1 
2005 1.3 6.1 13.2 22.7 56.7 44.3 
2006 1.3 6.1 13.5 22.8 56.2 43.6 
2007 1.2 5.5 12.9 22.6 57.8 49.0 
2008 1.0 5.8 13.0 22.9 57.3 60.3 
2009 0.7 5.2 12.8 23.2 58.1 85.3 
2010 1.2 5.1 12.6 22.8 58.3 47.8 
2011 0.9 5.5 13.3 23.4 56.9 66.1 
2012 1.2 5.8 13.5 22.8 56.7 48.5 
2013 0.9 5.6 13.1 23.0 57.5 62.0 
2014 1.4 5.7 13.1 22.7 57.1 41.0 
2015 1.1 5.8 13.2 22.8 57.2 52.1 
2016 1.1 6.0 12.9 22.7 57.2 51.1 
2017 1.1 5.4 12.8 22.3 58.4 53.9 
       
Change  -19.5% -12.8% -9.0% -2.2% 5.1% 30.5% 
       
                                                           
7 Source:  
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/cv!recreate.action?pid=1110019301&selectedNodeIds=2D2,2D3,3D2,3D3&check
edLevels=0D1,3D1,3D2&refPeriods=19990101,20170101&dimensionLayouts=layout2,layout2,layout2,layout2,layout3&v
ectorDisplay=false 
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3. Measuring Consumption Inequality: Challenges and Pitfalls  
Income inequality estimates come mostly from disposable income. However, there is more to well-
being than disposable income insofar as consumption of health, education, access to public goods, 
quality of the environment, public safety, etc., may not require financial outlays.  
I first review some research articles and papers that look at consumption inequality before looking at the 
OECD program on the definition of a more comprehensive measure of disposable income. The program 
objective is to obtain a more informative characterization of income inequality across countries and 
within countries. A key element of the program is the measurement of social transfers in kind (STiK) in 
different countries.  
Statistics Canada released new measures of household actual final consumption (HAFC) in March 2019,8 
by adding to household final consumption expenditure (HFCE) the social transfers in kind (STiK). 
Statistics Canada defines the social transfers in-kind as transfers in kind to households made by the 
various levels of government as well as by non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH). Those 
transfers include off-market production (services with zero or insignificant prices) of household services. 
They also include the purchase of goods and services intended to be transferred to households. Using 
the data released by Statistics Canada will allow a better characterization of consumption inequality.  
A short review of research on consumption inequality  
Gravel et al. (2005)9 aim to expand the notion of inequality beyond disposable income. They write: 
“Disposable income is not the only ingredient of well-being. Also important are health, education (or 
information) and free access to various public goods such as roads and public transportation, quality 
of the environment, public safety, etc. Hence a mere focus on the distribution of disposable income 
fall quite short of providing us with an adequate picture of the distribution of well-being in the 
population.”  
They first introduce besides disposable income two public goods: infant mortality, a proxy for health 
system efficiency and coverage, and pupil/teacher ratio at public schools, a proxy for education 
spending. In spite of significant data challenges, they conclude that “a comparison of standard 
unidimensional inequality indices based on the distribution of disposable income alone with 
multidimensional ones suggests a strong correlation between the behavior of the indices. This at 
least suggests that the widespread practice of focusing only on unidimensional income inequality 
                                                           
8 Released at 8:30 a.m. Eastern time in The Daily, Wednesday, March 20, 2019 
9 Nicolas Gravel, Arnaud Lefranc, Nicolas Pistolesi, Benoit Tarroux, Alain Trannoy (2005), “Appraising Inequalities in 
the Western World: Is individual disposable income all that matters?” mimeo. 
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does not provide a too bad information of the overall performance of the OECD countries in terms 
multidimensional inequalities with respect to both disposable income and public good.”   
They then use a dataset containing national household surveys for nine countries to analyze the 
inequality of opportunity compared to the inequality of outcomes. They find that “there is a 
correlation between the ranking of countries based on disposable income and that based on the 
equality of opportunity approach. This at least suggests that the standard practice of focusing on 
income inequality alone does not provide a bad approximation of the ranking of countries that would 
emerge from an equality of opportunity view point. Yet the correlation is not perfect.”10 
Meyer and Sullivan (2017)11 claim that inequality is often measured with income data while 
consumption data shows a view more reflective of overall economic wellbeing. Indeed, income is 
more variable than consumption because of saving and dissaving factors depending on the current 
state of individuals. It also does not reflect the flow of consumption that ownership of houses or cars 
might give. Consumption measures give a better picture of the effect of changes in the value of assets 
or of debt burden and access to credit.  
However, concerns with consumption measures reside in data quality. For consumption, under-
reporting is an issue and different surveys yield different results as a recall survey is less of a burden 
than a diary survey for participants. To avoid this problem, the authors suggest focusing on 
consumption categories that are well measured and equally important across household, such as food 
at home, gas expenses, rental value of housing or vehicles, etc., while taking into account price changes 
to reflect changes in overall spending.  
Official measures based on pre-tax money income do not account for tax credits or transfers in-kind 
such as housing benefits and food stamps. Using consumption inequality measure 90% / 10%, the 
authors show that consumption inequality has risen moderately by 5% between the 1960s and 1990s, 
while after-tax income inequality has risen by about 28% in the same timeframe. Using 50% / 10% or 
90% / 50% ratios, the pattern is similar. Changes in the top 1% income share are not included because 
consumption data for these individuals might be poorly measured. 
The difference between income and consumption measures stems from the under-reporting of income 
by low income families and its growth overtime. Also, for groups that receive high transfer income, 
                                                           
10 They add: “And the imperfection seems to take place in the set of countries that appear to show a ‘middle-ground’ 
performance in terms of both inequality of disposable income and inequality of opportunity. Specifically, it appears that 
countries like France, Italy and Spain do worse in terms of equality of opportunity than in term of equality of disposable 
income while a somewhat converse verdict holds for countries like Netherlands and Germany.” 
11 Bruce Meyer and James Sullivan (2017), “Consumption and Income Inequality in the US Since the 1960s”, NBER 
Working Paper No. 23655.  
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such as single-parent families, a difference is expected. Changes in asset values could explain why 
consumption inequality fell after 2006 as data show that consumption rose for the lowest quintile but 
fell for the other four.  
Norris and Pendakur (2015)12 provide an estimate of the evolution of consumption inequality in 
Canada from 1997 to 2009. Using consumption to measure inequality is better in theory because the 
level of consumption is a choice by the household that depends on past, current and future income. 
So, it is more representative of permanent income. It is also seen as the main generator of well-being. 
From an empirical point of view, survey data on consumption might be better than on income, most 
notably in the tails of the distribution (tax avoidance at the top and multiple sources of income at the 
bottom).  
However, measuring consumption inequality introduces some technical problems. It is not as simple 
as adding expenditures of households because it would not accurately capture the consumption of 
durables, such as houses and cars. For example, owner-occupiers of houses don’t report their shelter 
expenditures by year, which would represent the « flow » of consumption provided by the utilization 
of the house. This correction is important if we want to compare inequality as the ownership rate is 
different between groups of people. The authors use the Surveys of Household Spending (SHS) from 
1997 to 2009 to impute rent from an estimator that corrects for selection bias and then to estimate 
inequality using the Gini measure. They also use price data to see if the Gini coefficient is sensible to 
adjustments in prices. In theory, it should not, but if growth in prices have been asymmetrical between 
groups of households, there could be differences.  
They find that consumption inequality rose from 1997 to 2006, from 0,251 to 0,275 Gini points, an 
increase of 2,4 percentage points, but declined between 2007 and 2009, from 0,275 to 0,264 Gini 
points, a decrease of 1,1 percentage point. They also find that while income inequality increased from 
1997 to 2006, the decrease afterwards compensated for it, which means that during the entire period 
1997-2009, income inequality has essentially been flat. Considering this post-2006 decline in 
inequality, they speculate that the minimum wage increases and the solidity of the labour market could 
have contributed to a higher growth in wages at the bottom of the distribution than at the top. The poor 
stock market performance during this period might also have contributed to a reduction in inequality: 
asset prices fell and since most assets are held by individuals at the top of the distribution, inequality 
fell.  
                                                           
12 Sam Norris and Krishna Pendakur (2015), “Consumption Inequality in Canada, 1997 to 2009”, Canadian Journal of 
Economics, 48(2), pp 773-792. 
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Sarlo (2016)13 states that income inequality depends on the measure of income used, market revenue, 
total income, after-tax income, household size adjusted after-tax income, etc. and that consumption is 
a better measure, since it is a direct proxy of choices that agents make to maximize their well-being. 
Trends in consumption and income are essentially explained by age: the young (0-25) and the old 
(65+) have lower income than individuals 25-65. In relative terms, it is in this age range that income 
is at its highest, and that expenses are at the lowest. This means that savings are at their highest. The 
young and the old, on the contrary, have the tendency to save and dissave to smooth consumption 
while taking into account their intertemporal wealth. 
Thus, following this hypothesis, consumption is less volatile and sensitive to demographic changes 
than income. It is also less affected by transitory shocks that impede income earning (job loss, 
promotions, separation, illnesses to name a few). 
Underreporting is also less of a problem than for income (through fiscal avoidance and evasion, mostly 
–in percentage- from low-income individuals), implying that the inequality might seem more 
important than they are. However, consumption still has notable problems: low response rate in 
surveys, measurement errors (recalling the exact amounts of spending is unlikely). However, if these 
errors are random, it should not affect inequality measures. 
Sarlo does not use a flow of consumption (imputed rent) instead of punctual purchases. For example, 
buying a house in 2015 gives of utility not only in 2015, but also in 2016, etc. so that the present value 
of the flow is equivalent to the 2015 purchase. The reasoning for not using this concept is that if there 
are not enough differences in time that would skew inequality towards a direction more than another, 
his simpler approach would make sense. 
Other studies sometimes adjust for price changes to obtain a real consumption inequality measure. 
However, finding decent regional price indexes is arduous and not readily available. A major problem 
with consumption as a measure of inequality is substitution (buying similar products at lower prices) 
and price-searching. It is known that the poor tend to have a lower opportunity cost of time than 
individuals at the higher end of the distribution, which implies that they might tend to search for better 
deals while using less money to buy the same goods as the rich. Not adjusting for this problem would 
imply greater measured inequality than realised. 
Another problem is that data ignores improvements in quality for appliances, cars, electronic devices, 
etc., which would tend to benefit the poor, thereby overstating inequality. 
                                                           
13 Christopher Sarlo (2016), “Consumption Inequality in Canada: Is the Gap Growing?”, Fraser Institute. 
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To adjust for these considerations and get pure results (untainted by unnecessary adjustments), Sarlo 
uses an adjustment for the size of the household, namely the square root of the household size. This 
correction is applied because real consumption of individuals is lower than the consumption of the 
household, but higher than if they were living alone.  
So, changes in prices or in the household sizes could have appreciable impacts on inequality trends. If 
relative prices of comparable goods change more for the rich than for the poor, the latter could 
substitute and pay less for a similar good basket. Furthermore, households are on average smaller than 
they were in 1970, implying that consumption is now distributed between a smaller group of 
individuals. Therefore, using an adult-equivalent factor is a must. 
Using data from the survey of family expenditures (1969-1997) and the survey of household spending 
(1997-2009),14 arguably the most comprehensive surveys available in Canada, Sarlo finds that 
consumption inequality is lower than income inequality. More interestingly, income inequality has 
risen by 11% over the 40-year period up to 2009 using after-tax-adjusted income, while consumption 
inequality has risen by 3% over the same period. 
It would then be unwise to argue that the living standard is more unequal in 2009 than in 1969, which 
is surprising considering all of the changes that occurred within society, namely demography, 
population aging, higher divorce rates and more single parent families, higher labour force 
participation of women, the expansion of the tertiary sector of the economy, higher college attendance, 
more two-salary families, etc. While the 11% increase in income inequality is significant, it might 
overstate real inequality if we were to consider quality improvement and substitution behaviours of 
low-income consumers. While these results are interesting, Sarlo warns the reader than one should not 
make definitive conclusions, because the data used is not without major flaws. 
The OECD program 
The OECD program to obtain a more comprehensive measure of disposable income concentrates in part 
on identifying social transfers in kind (STiK) in different countries. STiK turn out to represent roughly 
20% of the household actual final consumption expenditures (HAFC), which is defined as the household 
final consumption expenditures (HFCE) plus the social transfers in kind (STiK). 
Hermansen (2017)15 relies on the OECD Income Distribution Database to characterize the global 
income distribution between all individuals living in the developed world. He shows that global 
                                                           
14 The survey of family expenditures has been integrated into the survey of household spending as of 1997.  
15 Mikkel Hermansen (2017), “The Global Income Distribution for High-Income Countries,” Economics Department WP 
no. 1402, OECD ECO/WKP(2017)34. 
 
 
25 
 
inequality for the group of high-income countries, as measured by the Gini coefficient, has increased 
by almost 3 Gini points from 1995 to 2013, in contrast to global inequality at the world level estimated 
to have fallen by more than 2 Gini points from 1988 to 2008 (Lakner and Milanovic2016).  
According to Hermansen, his result is “mainly driven by top 10% incomes growing more than middle 
and lower incomes and the bottom 10% falling behind. Rising inequality within the United States 
drives almost half of the inequality increase among high-income countries, a combination of a sizeable 
rise in inequality and a population share around a third in the sample.” The result also reflects the 
impact of the 2008-09 crisis, and is sensitive to the inclusion of Japan, which experienced a substantial 
decline in real incomes.  
Furthermore, to check for robustness, Hermansen analyzes explicitly the inclusion of social transfers 
in kind (STiK) in the framework. STiK can be useful because they are sizeable and differences 
between countries are important. For example, in nordic countries, STiK represent about 25% of 
average household disposable income, which is more than twice what they represent in the US. Using 
national accounts aggregates indicate that adding STiK to household disposable incomes may lift 
household income growth substantially. Decomposing the rise in global inequality for high-income 
countries into within- and between country contributions shows that the bulk of the increase is due to 
the increase in within country inequality in a majority of high-income countries.  
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Statistics Canada: A more sophisticated treatment of STiK 
Statistics Canada released new measures of household actual final consumption (HAFC) in March 
2019,16 justifying and characterizing those new measures as supplementing traditional estimates of 
household final consumption expenditure (HFCE) by including "social transfers in kind" (STiK), which 
represents the value of services and some specific goods that are financed by governments and non-
profit institutions but consumed by households. These services include mainly health and education 
services, along with a range of other categories. 
The “Social Transfers in-Kind” (STiK) measure transfers in kind to households made by the various 
levels of government as well as by non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH). STiK include 
off-market production (services with zero or insignificant prices) of household services. They also 
include the purchase of goods and services intended to be transferred to households. 
The provision of these services to households can also be considered as income, provided to the user in 
kind rather than as a money transfer. The broader income concept is referred to as household adjusted 
disposable income (HADI). Statistics Canada: “These new measures are in line with international 
standards, which recommend including social transfers in kind to calculate supplementary measures of 
consumption and income. The measures facilitate cross-national comparisons, as social transfers in kind 
consumed by households are financed to varying degrees across countries.” 
Table 6 shows that social transfers in kind in Canada increased steadily from $132 billion in 1999 to 
$224 billion in 2008 to $315 billion in 2018, in nominal terms. Most social transfers in kind are financed 
by governments, representing $281 billion (89.2%) in 2018, while those financed by non-profit 
institutions accounted for $34 billion (10.8%). As a proportion of total household consumption, social 
transfers in kind have remained relatively stable at about 20%, a significant amount.  
Table 6 shows how STiK from governments and from non-profit institutions are distributed by 
expenditures items. Statistics Canada: “Social transfers in kind from governments are primarily 
composed of health and education services, which account for 90% of the government transfers in kind. 
Health services represent just over half, and their share edged up from 52.5% in 2008 to 54.3% in 2018. 
Education services were the second largest category (34.8%), and have remained stable over the 10-year 
period.” Other categories are housing, recreation and culture, and social protection. 
Although the nominal value of the services they provided in kind is smaller in relation to governments, 
non-profit institutions (NPISH) generally offered different types of services. These include social 
                                                           
16 Released at 8:30 a.m. Eastern time in The Daily, Wednesday, March 20, 2019 
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protection, such as childcare and old age protection, which accounted for $8.0 billion (23.5% of their 
STiK spending) in 2018, as well as other services, such as religious services and those provided by grant-
making and giving organizations. 
Table 6: The composition of total social transfers in kind (STiK) in $million  
and their share in the household actual final consumption (HAFC). 
All households. 
Canada as a whole 1999-2018 
Year 
Social 
Transfers 
in kind 
(StiK) 
STiK 
Education 
STiK 
Health 
STiK 
Other 
Household 
final 
consumption 
expenditure 
HFCE  
Household  
actual final 
consumption 
expenditure 
HAFC  = 
HFCE+STiK 
Share 
STiK/HAFC 
in % 
1999 132,720 46,502 59,519 26,699 550,621 683,341 19.4% 
  141,755 48,526 64,702 28,527 585,931 727,686 19.5% 
  151,304 51,096 69,632 30,576 612,157 763,461 19.8% 
  160,333 53,420 73,951 32,962 648,425 808,758 19.8% 
  168,914 55,619 78,929 34,366 677,936 846,850 19.9% 
  176,134 58,221 82,360 35,553 709,483 885,617 19.9% 
  185,461 61,494 86,085 37,882 749,063 934,524 19.8% 
  198,823 66,632 91,990 40,201 790,454 989,277 20.1% 
  209,376 68,398 99,016 41,962 838,954 1,048,330 20.0% 
2008  224,274 72,399 106,208 45,667 875,201 1,099,475 20.4% 
  234,351 76,145 112,557 45,649 878,203 1,112,554 21.1% 
  243,381 79,387 117,727 46,267 923,451 1,166,832 20.9% 
  255,838 83,227 123,927 48,684 963,912 1,219,750 21.0% 
  262,570 84,913 127,760 49,897 995,045 1,257,615 20.9% 
  269,324 87,040 132,000 50,284 1,034,803 1,304,127 20.7% 
  277,382 90,460 136,364 50,558 1,083,056 1,360,438 20.4% 
  286,904 92,656 141,318 52,930 1,118,491 1,405,395 20.4% 
  294,350 94,679 144,408 55,263 1,153,256 1,447,606 20.3% 
  302,353 96,879 148,091 57,383 1,208,437 1,510,790 20.0% 
2018 315,358 101,011 154,392 59,955 1,254,489 1,569,847 20.1% 
          
2018/1999 237.6% 217.2% 259.4% 224.6% 227.8% 229.7%   
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STiK data come from a variety of aggregated sources. STiK from governments are taken from the 
Canadian Classification of Functions of Government (CCOFOG) which separates the proportions 
of government spending according to whether it is collective spending (such as defense) or 
individual spending (health, education, etc.). These data come from the Canadian Government 
Finance Statistics (CGFS), which collects public data through various administrative files.  
We learn from Statistics Canada,17 that the distinction between individual and collective 
consumption expenditure was introduced in SNA 1993. Individual services or consumption 
expenditure is the amount spent by an institutional unit during an accounting period to purchase 
consumption goods and services for the benefit of a specific individual or group of individuals that 
could, in principle, be identified. Collective services or consumption expenditure is the amount 
spent by an institutional unit during an accounting period to purchase consumption goods and 
services for the benefit of the collectivity living within or visiting a local community, or a city, or a 
province, or the country as a whole. 
Individual consumption expenditure includes both purchases of goods and services by households 
for their own use and the provision of goods and services to specific households or groups of 
households by government and NPISH units. The former includes purchases of food, clothing, 
transportation and a wide range of other consumer products by households. The latter includes, for 
example, the provision of elementary and secondary schooling to children and the provision of 
health care services. 
Collective consumption expenditure, in contrast, corresponds (broadly? Since it is not only pure 
public goods?) to the economic concept of the 'public good'—products that an individual cannot be 
effectively excluded from using and for which one individual's consumption does not significantly 
reduce the availability of the good or service for others. Examples of collective consumption 
expenditures include spending on policing, defence services, Parliament and general public 
administration. 
Thus, the aggregated individual services expenditure (IS) data represent the STiK of the various 
levels of government. For example, for health, the individual expenditure categories are: "Medical 
products, appliances, and equipment", "Outpatient services", "Hospital services" and "Public health 
                                                           
17 https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/13-606-g/2016001/article/14618-eng.htm 
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services". For education, the categories are: "Primary and Secondary education", "College 
education", "University education", "Education not definable by level" and "Subsidiary services to 
education". 
The objective of Statistics Canada is to estimate the social transfers in kind (STiK) to households 
from government and from non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH).18 The estimates are 
then added to household final consumption expenditure (HFCE) to get household actual final 
consumption (HAFC).  
It is useful to recall the definition of household actual final HAFC consumption, which can be 
summarized as the sum of household final consumption expenditure (HFCE), social transfers in 
kind from governments and social transfers in kind from NPISH. Moreover, social transfers in kind 
exist only for certain household expenditure categories: Housing, water, electricity, gas and other 
fuels; health; recreation and culture; education; miscellaneous goods and services (including social 
protection); other services (religion, political parties, labour and professional organisations, 
environmental protection.19   
To obtain data between 1999 and 2018 (in accordance with DHEA20), Statistics Canada uses OECD 
data to measure STiK retroactively. So, with the total of government STiK and NPISH STiK, it 
only remains to show how these data are allocated to the different economic agents. Statistics 
Canada has survey data on disposable income as well as consumption (mainly from the Survey of 
Household Spending (SHS)). In this way, it obtains an estimate of the distribution of income and 
consumption in the population. With this distribution, households are grouped by income quintile.   
The distribution of STiK across quintiles 
To distribute STiK, Statistics Canada uses proxy variables to estimate the proportions of STiK going 
to different types of households, and then impute this data to the income quintiles defined earlier. 
                                                           
18 https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/13-607-x/2016001/1390-eng.htm 
19 For STiK coming from NPISH, Statistics Canada uses final demand data between 2008 and 2018, as estimated 
with the “Supply Use Tables” (SUT), which make it possible to obtain the amounts that the NPISH spent to provide 
services to households, which is considered equal to the total consumption of their services by households. To obtain 
more recent data, Statistics Canada also uses NPISH T4 “wages and salaries” to estimate the growth in final demand 
for their services. 
20 The Distributions of Household Economic Accounts (DHEA) data available from Statistics Canada. Tables 36-10-
0585-01, 36-10-0586-01, 36-10-0589-01 and 36-10-0590-01 contain the data related to the wealth distributions, 
tables 36-10-0587-01 and 36-10-0588-01 contain the distributions related to income, consumption and saving, and 
table 36-10-0101-01 contains the distributions related to household counts. 
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It uses various socio-demographic information sources to refine allocations by quintile. For 
instance, Canadian Institute for Health Information is used to differentiate spending proportions by 
age, sex and geography. If there is no proxy variable available, it separates STiK uniformly 
according to quintiles; this is a very small proportion, so it shouldn't have a big impact. The 
following table presents some proxy variables used to distribute the STiK to the different quintiles.21 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 shows how STiK from governments and from non-profit institutions are distributed by 
expenditure items for different quintiles (we show the first and fifth quintiles only). We observe 
that the most important STiK expenditure items in 2018 is health for both the lowest quintile (45%) 
and the highest quintile (51%). We observe also that between 1999 and 2018, STiK expenditures 
on education increased by 54.6% and 65.4% respectively for the lowest and highest quintiles, while 
STiK expenditures on health increased by 119.0% and 95.5% respectively for the lowest and 
highest quintiles.22    
  
                                                           
21 Although STiK data exist for most advanced countries under OECD methodological instructions; see Mikkel 
Hermansen (2017) cited above #15. Statistics Canada is the first government statistics institution to rigorously 
allocate STiK spending (in total and by component) across groups of households, more precisely across quintiles at 
this time. The standard procedure until now (and still used in most if not all empirical studies) is to distribute STiK 
spending equally across all households.  
22 These results show the importance of path-breaking efforts by Statistics Canada to allocate STiK spending across 
households. 
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Table 7. Allocation of social transfers in kind (STiK) across quintiles. 
Value per household, lowest and highest quintiles. 
Canada as a whole 1999-2018 
(10.721 = 10 721$) 
 L K M N O P Q R S 
 STiK  STiK: education STiK: health STiK: other 
 lowest highest  lowest highest lowest highest lowest Highest 
 N+P+R O+Q+S K/L       
1999 10.721 10.384 0.97 4.229 3.198 4.032 4.893 2.460 2.293 
2000 11.117 10.954 0.99 4.132 3.455 4.374 5.091 2.612 2.408 
2001 11.575 11.479 0.99 4.294 3.529 4.541 5.430 2.740 2.520 
2002 12.419 11.850 0.95 4.622 3.606 4.848 5.543 2.949 2.701 
2003 13.025 12.026 0.92 4.854 3.590 5.113 5.670 3.058 2.766 
2004 13.036 12.588 0.97 4.811 3.902 5.046 5.871 3.179 2.815 
2005 13.363 13.050 0.98 4.696 4.032 5.358 6.041 3.309 2.977 
2006 14.071 13.949 0.99 4.785 4.382 5.818 6.487 3.468 3.080 
2007 14.873 14.676 0.99 4.977 4.422 6.313 7.098 3.583 3.156 
2008 15.516 15.547 1.00 5.189 4.634 6.525 7.482 3.802 3.432 
2009 15.988 15.813 0.99 5.512 4.491 6.686 7.934 3.790 3.388 
2010 16.195 16.295 1.01 5.403 4.982 6.99 7.959 3.802 3.354 
2011 16.895 17.158 1.02 5.834 5.360 7.181 8.330 3.880 3.468 
2012 17.965 17.456 0.97 6.384 5.099 7.514 8.800 4.067 3.557 
2013 18.126 17.740 0.98 6.557 5.258 7.555 9.001 4.015 3.480 
2014 18.282 17.616 0.96 6.350 5.394 7.982 8.737 3.950 3.485 
2015 18.597 17.853 0.96 6.471 5.114 8.040 9.156 4.086 3.583 
2016 18.847 18.138 0.96 6.548 5.056 8.107 9.379 4.192 3.704 
2017 19.105 18.263 0.96 6.368 5.160 8.436 9.317 4.301 3.787 
2018 19.807 18.773 0.95 6.537 5.290 8.829 9.567 4.441 3.916 
          
Combining STiK data, disposable income, and consumption data 
Finally, the STiK are added to the disposable household income (it is as if the STiK were an 
income that the government gives to households which makes it possible to buy the STiK 
consumed) as well as to the final consumption expenditure to give the "Adjusted household 
disposable income” and “Household actual final consumption”. Since STiK are added to the two 
measures, net household savings remain unchanged.  
The introduction of social transfers in kind estimates complements current existing measures, 
notably household final consumption expenditures and household disposable income. By adding 
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STiK to these measures, we now obtain household actual final consumption (HAFC) and 
household adjusted disposable income (HADI): HAFC is the sum of household final consumption 
expenditure, individual consumption of goods and services from government, and individual 
consumption of goods and services from NPISH. 
HAFC is an important component of Canadian macroeconomic statistics and allows for a more 
meaningful understanding of living standards by considering the consumption of households, not 
only from their own final expenditure but also from the final expenditure of other sectors that 
benefit them. Health care and education are high costs that Canadians benefit from through 
policies and programs that are funded through the tax system. These types of consumption are 
important considerations as it enhances the understanding of economic well-being of Canadians. 
Corrected consumption inequalities 
We observe in Table 8 that STiK represent in 1999 about 74.2% of disposable income for 
households in the lowest quintile, but about 11.2% of disposable income for households in the 
highest quintile. In 2018, those percentages reach 84.2% and 11.6% respectively. Clearly, STiK 
will have an impact on consumption inequality measures based on HAFC as well as on income 
inequality based on HADI.  
Table 8 presents partially corrected consumption inequality changes over the last twenty years or 
so. We see that the traditional measure of disposable income indicates that the ratio of average 
disposable income (highest quintile over lowest quintile), C/B in Table 8, has increased by 7.4% 
from 6.42 to 6.89, a significant increase. But the ratio of household adjusted final consumption 
(HAFC), L/K in Table 8, has decreased by 17.1% from 2,49 to 2,06. This is a rather significant 
change in just two decades.       
The change in disposable income has been more important for the highest quintile (+74.9%) than 
for the lowest quintile (+62.8%), that is, the change in disposable income of the highest quintile 
has been 119.2% that of the lowest quintile, which suggest a notable increase in income inequality 
over the last two decades.  
But the change in consumption (HFCE) has been much less important for the highest quintile 
(+70.3%) than for lowest quintile (+116.9%), that is, the increase for the highest quintile has been 
60.2% the increase for the lowest quintile, which is in line with the original hypothesis of this 
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paper: the rich were consuming a lot already at the beginning of the period and there is a limit to 
consumption, so the gains in wellbeing have been more important for the lowest quintile.  
In addition, we have STiK whose increase has been more important for lowest quintile (+84.7%) 
than for highest quintile (+80.8%), although by a slight margin. The total increase in consumption 
(HAFC) has therefore been more important for lowest quintile (+106.8%) than for highest quintile 
(+71.6%), that is, the increase for the highest quintile has been 67.0% the increase for the lowest 
quintile, which is a significant development. It suggests both a significant increase in wellbeing 
for both quintiles but mainly for the lowest quintile and a significant decrease in consumption 
inequality, over the last two decades. 
The distribution of government common spending across quintiles 
In addition to social transfers in kind distributed over income quintiles, we have the government 
spending, which is common to all and cannot be distributed or assigned to individual households 
in any simple way. As shown in Table 9, the level of such spending has increased by 38.8%, at an 
annual rate of 3.3%, between 2008 and 2018.  
Clearly, these expenditures contribute to the wellbeing of the population, although its allocation 
among households (quintiles) cannot be done with confidence. As for information goods and 
services and assets in general, the allocation would require estimates of how the typical household 
in each quintile value those expenditures, through some form of Lindahl pricing or value,23 that is, 
through some form of willingness to pay estimates and cooperative game allocation procedure, 
which cannot be done with confidence at this time. The most one could do at this time is to allocate 
the general government common spending on items 707-710 in the same way as STiK were 
distributed across quintiles. It is not done here.
                                                           
23 See Marcel Boyer and Anne Catherine Faye (2018), “Music Royalty Rates for Different Business Models: Lindahl 
Pricing and Nash Bargaining,” In: Marciano A. and Ramello G. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. 
Springer, New York, NY, 2018. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6. See also Marcel Boyer 
(2019), “The Three-Legged Stool of Music Value: Hertzian Radio, SiriusXM, Spotify”, pp. 13-40 in Ysolde 
Gendreau (ed.), Le Droit d’Auteur en Action : Perspectives Internationales sur les Recours / Copyright in Action: 
International Perspectives on Remedies / El Derecho de Autor en Acción: Perspectivas Internationales sobre los 
Medios de Protección, Proceedings of the 2018 World Congress of ALAI (Alliance littéraire et artistique 
internationale), Éditions Thémis, Montréal 2019, 490 pages.  
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Table 8: STiK and HAFC  
Value per household - Canada as a whole 1999-2018  
 
lowest highest ratio lowest highest ratio ratio lowest highest ratio
B C C/B E F F/E H H/B I I/C I/H K L L/K
1999 14.455 92.747 6.42 23.640 75.144 3.18 10.721 74.2% 10.384 11.2% 0.97 34.361 85.528 2.49
2000 14.264 100.350 7.04 24.935 79.300 3.18 11.117 77.9% 10.954 10.9% 0.99 36.052 90.254 2.50
2001 15.620 103.269 6.61 25.096 81.032 3.23 11.575 74.1% 11.479 11.1% 0.99 36.671 92.511 2.52
2002 16.204 105.937 6.54 26.997 84.767 3.14 12.419 76.6% 11.850 11.2% 0.95 39.416 96.617 2.45
2003 16.836 108.378 6.44 27.600 87.130 3.16 13.025 77.4% 12.026 11.1% 0.92 40.625 99.156 2.44
2004 16.730 113.539 6.79 29.968 90.605 3.02 13.036 77.9% 12.588 11.1% 0.97 43.004 103.193 2.40
2005 16.500 116.768 7.08 32.370 94.106 2.91 13.363 81.0% 13.050 11.2% 0.98 45.733 107.156 2.34
2006 17.814 125.223 7.03 35.849 96.807 2.70 14.071 79.0% 13.949 11.1% 0.99 49.920 110.756 2.22
2007 19.150 129.668 6.77 37.665 101.159 2.69 14.873 77.7% 14.676 11.3% 0.99 52.538 115.835 2.20
2008 19.461 135.060 6.94 39.221 102.903 2.62 15.516 79.7% 15.547 11.5% 1.00 54.737 118.450 2.16
2009 19.963 135.642 6.79 38.577 102.079 2.65 15.988 80.1% 15.813 11.7% 0.99 54.565 117.892 2.16
2010 21.142 138.108 6.53 40.886 105.479 2.58 16.195 76.6% 16.295 11.8% 1.01 57.081 121.774 2.13
2011 21.351 141.864 6.64 41.080 107.348 2.61 16.895 79.1% 17.158 12.1% 1.02 57.975 124.506 2.15
2012 22.404 145.500 6.49 42.591 109.955 2.58 17.965 80.2% 17.456 12.0% 0.97 60.556 127.411 2.10
2013 21.946 151.454 6.90 44.536 112.345 2.52 18.126 82.6% 17.740 11.7% 0.98 62.662 130.085 2.08
2014 22.831 152.976 6.70 46.055 116.353 2.53 18.282 80.1% 17.616 11.5% 0.96 64.337 133.969 2.08
2015 22.104 159.154 7.20 46.566 119.903 2.57 18.597 84.1% 17.853 11.2% 0.96 65.163 137.756 2.11
2016 21.760 153.566 7.06 47.676 121.816 2.56 18.847 86.6% 18.138 11.8% 0.96 66.523 139.954 2.10
2017 22.563 159.543 7.07 49.805 125.468 2.52 19.105 84.7% 18.263 11.4% 0.96 68.910 143.731 2.09
2018 23.537 162.231 6.89 51.264 127.963 2.50 19.807 84.2% 18.773 11.6% 0.95 71.071 146.736 2.06
Change* 62.8% 74.9% 7.4% 116.9% 70.3% -21.5% 84.7% 13.5% 80.8% 3.4% -2.1% 106.8% 71.6% -17.1%
119.2% 60.2% 95.3% 67.0%
* 2018/1999
Statistics Canada. Table 36-10-0587-01 Distributions of household economic accounts,  income, consumption and saving, by characteristic
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3610058701
DOI: https://doi.org/10.25318/3610058701-eng
HAFC
CANADA: Household Income and consumption by quintile
HFCE (Householf Final Consumption Expenditures), StiK (Social Transfer in Kind), HAFC (Household Adjusted Consumption Expenditures) 
Statistics Canada - Table: 36-10-0587-01 (formerly CANSIM 378-0152)
Income quintiles are assigned based on the equalized household disposable income.  
This takes into account differences in household size and composition. The Oxford-modified equivalence scale is used;  
it assigns a value of 1 to the first adult, 0.5 to each additional person aged 14 and over, and 0.3 for all children under 14.
lowest highest
Change High/low
Disposable Income HFCE STiK
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Table 9: Consolidated Canadian General Government Spending (millions)  
Canada as a whole 2008-2018 
 
 
 
 
Reference 
period
Health [707]
Recreation, 
culture and 
religion 
[708]
Education 
[709]
Social 
protection 
[710]
SUM         
701-710
SUM          
707-710
STiK from 
GG in      
707-710
STiK from 
NPISH
STiK     
total
GG 
common 
spending 
in 707-710
TOTAL GG 
common 
spending
2008 204.431 125.458     14.547      72.348      123.892     540.676    336,245 200,337 23,937 224,274 135,908 340,339
2009 210.951 133.246     14.527      76.766      134.802     570.292    359,341 211,383 22,968 234,351 147,958 358,909
2010 221.853 138.998     14.796      80.145      137.155     592.947    371,094 220,482 22,899 243,381 150,612 372,465
2011 227.879 145.819     15.707      83.711      140.713     613.829    385,950 231,172 24,666 255,838 154,778 382,657
2012 226.184 149.139     16.610      85.743      141.348     619.024    392,840 237,017 25,553 262,570 155,823 382,007
2013 226.313 154.292     16.679      88.536      144.774     630.594    404,281 242,895 26,429 269,324 161,386 387,699
2014 228.258 159.331     16.335      90.489      149.281     643.694    415,436 250,556 26,826 277,382 164,880 393,138
2015 232.318 165.025     17.423      91.762      157.582     664.110    431,792 258,329 28,575 286,904 173,463 405,781
2016 237.986 170.053     17.545      94.463      167.464     687.511    449,525 263,375 30,975 294,350 186,150 424,136
2017r 252.395 176.145     18.524      101.342   175.208     723.614    471,219 269,864 32,490 302,353 201,355 453,750
2018p 266.896 178.744     19.283      104.153   184.704     753.780    486,884 281,333 34,025 315,358 205,551 472,447
2018/2008 30.6% 42.5% 32.6% 44.0% 49.1% 39.4% 44.8% 40.4% 42.1% 40.6% 51.2% 38.8%
Annual rate 2.7% 3.6% 2.9% 3.7% 4.1% 3.4% 3.8% 3.5% 3.6% 3.5% 4.2% 3.3%
Statistics Canada.  Table  10-10-0005-01   Canadian Classification of Functions of Government (CCOFOG) by consolidated component
General public services 
[701]+Defence [702]+Public order 
and safety [703]+Economic affairs 
[704]+Environmental protection 
[705]+Housing and community 
amenities [706]
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4. Adjusted disposable income, Consumption (HFCE, HAFC) and Savings. 
In Table 10 below, we present macroeconomic accounts (MEA) data on compensation of 
employees, mixed income, property income received and paid, transfers in dollars to and from 
governments (including taxes paid), disposable income, social transfers in kind (STiK), adjusted 
disposable income, consumption (both HFCE and HAFC) and net savings.  
The Table presents the most complete and inclusive data available, in particular regarding the STiK 
accounts, for which Statistics Canada is one of the first statistical agencies, if not the very first, to 
distribute those on a household income quintile basis. Such a distribution is essential for our 
purpose here of characterizing the evolution of consumption inequalities. 
The estimate of employment income includes wages and salaries as well as the broader concept of 
employers’ social contributions, including social contributions such as those to the CPP or QPP, 
workers’ compensation plans, pension plans and other benefit plans. It is closer to global 
compensation. Scholarships, bursaries and research grants are included as current transfers in 
dollars to households paid from governments.24 
In addition to including actual rental income from property owners as part of mixed income from 
self-employment, the MEA also includes an imputed rent calculation equivalent to the rental 
income homeowners would receive if they rented their dwelling. 
The MEA includes investment income from life insurance and pension plans, savings deposits, and 
other types of insurance. Actual rental income is included under mixed income. Although property 
income received includes investment income earned in pension plans, this amount is subsequently 
transferred out in current transfers paid. Also,25 property income paid includes interest payments 
on consumer credit, as well as interest on mortgages and non-mortgage loans.  
Government transfers include all transfer payments from federal and provincial governments 
programs intended to provide income support to certain groups, such as seniors, families and those 
injured in the workplace. The MEA also include scholarships, bursaries and research grants as well 
as transfers received from corporations for pension plan benefits.  
                                                           
24 https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/13-607-x/2016001/944-eng.htm 
25 The following paragraphs on term definitions of terms are taken from https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/13-
607-x/2016001/944-eng.htm  
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The MEA include transfers from non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH) and transfers 
received from non-residents, mainly through pensions paid by foreign governments and from non-
resident households for purposes such as providing financial assistance. 
Current transfers paid represents the income tax paid. For practical and quality reasons, the 
macroeconomic reference period for income taxes is on a cash basis instead of using an accrual 
method referring to the period of the economic activity: all amounts paid during the year as income 
tax are counted whether they are for past, current or future liabilities.  
In addition to government income taxes paid, the MEA concept includes both employees’ and 
employers’ contributions to those social insurance plans. employer pension plan income (benefits) 
are included in the current transfers received from corporations, while the current transfers paid to 
corporations include all income that is not actually received by households (contributions and 
investment income). 
Transfers to NPISH mainly include charitable donations, while transfers to non-residents are 
mainly payments of income taxes to foreign government on earnings received from investments in 
foreign securities, as well as transfers to non-resident households for purposes such as providing 
financial assistance. 
Household disposable income is the sum of all revenue sources minus “current transfers paid” and 
“property income paid”.  
Statistics Canada characterizes the adjustment for changes in pension entitlements (see L63 in 
Table 10 below) as follows: The use of disposable income account also contains an adjustment for 
changes in pension entitlements. The secondary distribution of income account determines gross 
disposable income. In doing so, it excludes the contributions of employers and employees to 
pension funds since these contributions, once made, reduce the amount of income that is 
'disposable'. However, these contributions are considered to be additions to the financial assets of 
the household sector and to the liabilities of the financial corporations and government sectors. 
They are therefore a form of gross saving, adding to households' equity in the pension funds. In 
addition, there can be other adjustments to households' net equity in these pension funds as, for 
example, when pension managers deduct fees from the account balance. If gross saving were 
determined simply by deducting final consumption expenditure from gross disposable income, 
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which excludes these contributions and other changes in entitlements, gross saving would be 
misstated. Accordingly, the additional 'resource' (for the household sector) and 'use' (for the 
financial corporations and government sectors) known as the 'adjustment for changes in pension 
entitlements' is added to the use of disposable income account. This brings gross saving back to its 
proper level.  
The adjustment is equal to: the total value of the actual and imputed social contributions payable 
into pension schemes, plus the total value of contribution supplements payable out of the property 
income attributed to pension fund beneficiaries, minus the value of the associated service 
charges, minus the total value of the pensions paid out as social insurance benefits by pensions 
schemes. 
Accordingly, the household sector's use of disposable income account includes gross disposable 
income and the adjustment for changes in pension entitlements as its 'resources' and final 
consumption expenditure and the balancing item, gross saving, as its 'uses'. The use of disposable 
income accounts for the government and NPISH sectors also include gross disposable income as 
their sole 'resource' and potentially include both individual consumption expenditure and collective 
consumption expenditure as well as the adjustment for changes in pension entitlements and gross 
saving as their 'uses'. There are no entries in the use of disposable income account for non-financial 
corporations, other than gross disposable income and gross saving which are equal since the sector 
does not make final consumption expenditures. Finally, the account for the financial corporation’s 
sector, and possibly also for the non-resident sector, includes as 'uses', in addition to gross saving, 
the adjustment for changes in pension entitlements which is the counterpart entry for the adjustment 
in the households account. 
In Table 10, we present data for years 1999-2002 and 2015-2018, although data exist for the in-
between years. The data must be read as follows. Employment income has increased for the lowest 
[highest] quintile households by 49.0% [72.7%] between 1999 and 2018. The ratio of household 
employment income of the highest quintile over the lowest quintile was 12.4 in 1999 and 14.4 in 
2018. The average “avg3” was 12.6 for years 1999-2001 and 15.3 for years 2016-2018, an increase 
of 21.3%, indicating an increase in household employment income inequality between the former 
and the latter periods. The corresponding increase in mixed income inequality is smaller at 13.5%.  
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Net transfers in dollars, which subtracts from transfers received the taxes paid to governments, are 
positive for lowest quintile households and increased by 100.4% between 1999 and 2018, while 
they are negative for highest quintile households and decreased by 57.0%, that is, became more 
negative. The ratio**, equal to -40,543 / (40,543 + 5,113), reaches -8.9 in 1999 and -7.2 in 2018.  
The avg3 ratio of net transfers in dollars decreased by 27.6% between the early three-year period 
and the late three-year period, indicating that the net transfers for the lowest quintile increased more 
than the net transfers for the highest quintile decreased. The difference in net transfers between the 
lowest and the highest quintiles increased by 61.9% from $45,656 in 1999 to $73,932 in 2018. This 
reduces income inequality.  
The total effect of changes in income (employment, mixed and property) and net transfers in dollars 
is that household disposable income has increased between 1999 and 2018 by 62.8% for the lowest 
quintile and 74.9% for the highest quintile, translating into a slight increase of 4.8% in the avg3 
ratio. 
The household final consumption expenditures (HFCE) has increased for the lowest [highest] 
quintile households by 116.9% [70.3%] between 1999 and 2018. The ratio of HFCE of household 
highest quintile over the lowest quintile was 3.2 in 1999 and 2.5 in 2018, the same levels as the 
avg3 ratios, a reduction of 21.0%, indicating a significant drop in consumption inequality.  
The social transfers in kind (STiK) increased for the lowest [highest] quintile households by 84.7% 
[80.8%] between 1999 and 2018. The ratio of STiK, for the highest quintile over the lowest quintile, 
remained at close to 1 for the entire period 1999-2018, translating into a small drop of -2.7% in the 
avg3 ratio.  
Adding up the HFCE and STiK, one obtains the household actual final consumption (HAFC), 
which increased by 106.8% [71.6%] for the lowest [highest] quintile households between 1999 and 
2018, for a reduction in the avg3 ratio of 16.8%. This shows a significant increase in consumption 
(106.8%) for the lowest quintile, which together with the smaller increase in consumption (71.6%) 
for the highest quintile translates into a significant drop in consumption inequality between the 
highest and the lowest quintiles.  
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Table 10: Disposable income, Adjusted disposable income, Consumption and Savings per Household 
by Quintile, Canada as a whole 1999-2018 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2015 2016 2017 2018 Variation
L3
lowest quintile 7,431 8,085 8,043 7,772 9,667 9,321 9,834 11,070 49.0%
highest quintile 92,031 102,729 103,404 109,175 154,244 149,596 153,853 158,904 72.7%
ratio 12.4 12.7 12.9 14.0 16.0 16.0 15.6 14.4
avg 3 21.3%
L9
lowest quintile 2,512 2,621 2,351 2,769 3,087 3,110 3,212 3,420
highest quintile 18,617 19,259 20,555 20,158 27,355 28,194 29,232 29,104
ratio 7.4 7.3 8.7 7.3 8.9 9.1 9.1 8.5
avg 3 13.5%
L15
lowest quintile 9,943 10,706 10,394 10,541 12,754 12,431 13,046 14,490 45.7%
highest quintile 110,648 121,988 123,959 129,333 181,599 177,790 183,085 188,008 69.9%
ratio 11.1 11.4 11.9 12.3 14.2 14.3 14.0 13.0
avg 3 19.9%
L21
lowest quintile -600 -626 -934 -564 -817 -821 -790 -1,197
highest quintile 22,643 23,210 23,271 21,192 38,329 34,389 36,872 37,891
ratio* 38.7 38.1 25.9 38.6 47.9 42.9 47.7 32.7
avg 3 19.9%
L27
lowest quintile 5,113 4,183 6,160 6,227 10,167 10,149 10,306 10,244 100.4%
highest quintile -40,543 -44,848 -43,962 -44,587 -60,774 -58,614 -60,414 -63,668 -57.0%
ratio** -8.9 -11.7 -8.1 -8.2 -7.0 -6.8 -6.9 -7.2
avg 3 -27.6%
L33
lowest quintile 14,455 14,264         15,620    16,204 22,104 21,760 22,563 23,537 62.8%
highest quintile 92,747 100,350 103,269 105,937 159,154 153,566 159,543 162,231 74.9%
ratio 6.4 7.0 6.6 6.5 7.2 7.1 7.1 6.9
avg 3 4.8%
L39
lowest quintile 23,640 24,935         25,096    26,997 46,566 47,676 49,805 51,264 116.9%
highest quintile 75,144 79,300 81,032 84,767 119,903 121,816 125,468 127,963 70.3%
ratio 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5
avg 3 -21.0%
L45
lowest quintile 10,721 11,117 11,575 12,419 18,597 18,847 19,105 19,807 84.7%
highest quintile 10,384 10,954 11,479 11,850 17,853 18,138 18,263 18,773 80.8%
ratio 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9
avg 3 -2.7%
L51
lowest quintile 25,176 25,381 27,195 28,623 40,701 40,607 41,668 43,344 72.2%
highest quintile 103,131 111,304 114,748 117,787 177,007 171,704 177,806 181,004 75.5%
ratio 4.1 4.4 4.2 4.1 4.3 4.2 4.3 4.2
avg 3 -0.2%
L57
lowest quintile 34,361 36,052 36,671 39,416 65,163 66,523 68,910 71,071 106.8%
highest quintile 85,528 90,254 92,511 96,617 137,756 139,954 143,731 146,736 71.6%
ratio 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
avg 3 -16.8%
L63
lowest quintile -8,848 -10,096 -9,287 -10,841 -24,844 -26,277 -27,415 -27,935 -215.7%
highest quintile 22,546 27,510 27,223 27,410 46,287 37,820 40,209 41,393 83.6%
ratio* 3.5 3.7 3.9 3.5 2.9 2.4 2.5 2.5
avg 3 -34.1%
Household disposable income = total income (L15+L21) plus nets tranfers in $ (L27)
Household final consumption expenditure (HFCE)
Social Transfers in Kind (STiK)
Household adjusted disposable income = Household disp. Inc. (L33) plus STiK (L45)
3.7 2.5
4.2 4.2
6.7 7.0
1.0 1.0
13.8
12.6 15.3
7.8 8.9
Household actual final consumption (HAFC)
Household net saving = L33 - L39 (or L51 - L57) plus Changes in pension entitlements
Employment income
Mixed Income
SUM of employment and mixed incomes
Net property income
Net transfers $ = transfers received in $ minus transfers paid in $ (taxes) 
2.5 2.1
3.2 2.5
34.2 41.1
-9.6 -7.0
11.5
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In terms of household net saving, one observes that between 1999 and 2018 the value of 
consumption minus the value of incomes/resources has increased by 215.7% for the lowest quintile, 
while the value of incomes/resources minus the value of consumption has increased by 83.6% for 
the highest quintile: in a sense, the surge in consumption of the lowest quintile of households has 
been made possible by the surge in savings by the highest quintile of households.       
5. Conclusion 
After reviewing the developments of income and wealth inequalities since 1920, we tackled the 
task of characterizing the development of consumption inequality, which is arguably the more 
important and socially relevant type of inequality. Consumption inequalities have been 
significantly reduced over the last decades and most likely for a much longer period of time. One 
important factor has been the development of social transfers in kind which add significant 
resources equal to about 80% of disposable income. In comparison, social transfers in kind 
represent a 10% addition to disposable income for the highest quintile.   
The nature of the links between wealth creation, the distribution of income and wealth and their 
redistribution remain front row elements of recurring debates in democracies. However, not all 
kinds or sources of inequality should be considered worrisome: inequality resulting from the choice 
of effort for example is presumably more ethical compared to inequality related to pure luck factors. 
A crystallizing element is the fact that CEOs of large corporations earned this last year an average 
281 times (a median 170 times) the median salary of their employees.26 Similarly, income 
distribution has become more unequal recently in the arts and sports. In recorded music, according 
to Thomson (2014),27 the top 1% of bands and solo artists earn 77% of all revenue from recorded 
music. In terms of concert revenues, Kruger (2013)28 claims that the top 1% of performers captured 
26% of revenues in 1982 and 56% in 2003, when the top 5 percent took home close to 90% of all 
                                                           
26 Marcel Boyer (2019) cited above #1.  
27 Derek Thomson (2014), « The Shazam Effect », The Atlantic, December 2014. The author writes also “Even when 
offered a universe of music, most of us prefer to listen to what we think everyone else is hearing”! 
28 Alan Kruger (2013), “Land of Hope and Dreams: Rock and Roll, Economics and Rebuilding the Middle Class”, 
Rock & Roll Hall of Fame, Cleveland (OH), June 12 2013. 
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concert revenues. Lunny29 claims that in 2019 the top 1% now commands a whopping 60% of 
revenue. 
In sports, according to Zingales (2010),30 the winner of the Masters golf tournament earned in 
2008 a prize equal to 103 times the annual salary of a groundkeeper, while it was three times in 
1948. Expressed in expected terms, as the number of golfers has increased a lot and the 
competition has become worldwide, the ratio falls from 103 to 13 according to Zingales. He adds: 
“The golf example is illuminating because the same two phenomena that are driving the rise in 
golf prizes – enhanced competition and the increased value of being at the top – have also 
occurred in the corporate world, roughly at the same time. As the world market becomes 
integrated, it is more difficult for a company to survive. In turn, a lot of executives who would 
have earned a decent living running mediocre companies are wiped out. At the same time, the 
most efficient firms can apply their advantage over the entire world market now. The value of 
being the best has increased disproportionately, and companies – just like the Augusta Golf Club 
– are not going to run the risk of losing the jackpot to save a few dollars on the executives.”  
One potential factor is that the size and complexity of companies and “tournaments”, where there 
is a winner-take-all syndrome, have increased with globalization: where there were two, three and 
more CEOs, there is now only one and where there were more winners in more (local) tournaments, 
there are fewer winners in fewer grand tournament contests. 
As Freeland (2012)31 puts it: “The average tenure of a Fortune 500 CEO has fallen from 9.5 years 
to 3.5 years over the past decade. That’s true lower down the food chain, too. Thomas Philippon, 
the economist who documented the connection between deregulation and soaring salaries on Wall 
Street, also found that the jobs of financiers were very insecure. Nor does being your own boss 
protect you from the uncertainty of the markets. At a 2011 seminar at the Central European 
University in Budapest devoted to the psychology of investing, George Soros told the gathered 
academics that ‘the markets are a machine for destroying the ego’.”   
                                                           
29 Oisin Lunny (2019), “Record Breaking Revenues in the Music Business, But Are Musicians Getting a Raw 
Deal?”, Forbes, May 15 2019. 
30 Luigi Zingales (2012), A Capitalism for the People, Basic Books 2012, page 20-25. The data is from 2008. It 
probably kept increasing during the last decade and more. 
31 Chrystia Freeland (2012), Plutocrats: The Rise of the New Global Super-Rich and the Fall of Everyone Else, 
Doubleday Canada.  
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One has to be careful before getting offended by the increase in income and wealth inequality. 
Watson (2015)32 writes: Our “preoccupation with inequality is an error and a trap. It is an error 
because inequality, unlike poverty, is not the problem it is so widely presumed to be. Inequality 
can be good, it can be bad, and it can be neither good nor bad but benign… Inequality is also a trap 
– not a trap anyone has set for us but one of our own making – because concern with it leads us to 
focus on the top end of the income distribution when our preoccupation should instead be the 
bottom where the bulk of human misery almost certainly resides.”    
The creation of wealth and the increase in productivity and wellbeing do not fall from the sky by 
the divine grace but are the fruit of the actions, research and reflections of creators, innovators and 
entrepreneurs who manage to produce more goods and services of better quality and greater value 
with the available resources (labor, materials, environment, capital).  
The distribution of wealth is much more egalitarian in developed countries and has become more 
egalitarian as the level of development has increased, but for the last four decades or so. Wealth 
creation in an economy or society is shared between and captured through labor compensation, 
corporate profits, interest and investment income, net income of farmers, taxes less subsidies 
(governments).  
A distinction must be made between the short term and the long term in wealth creation. In a period 
of accelerated technological transformation and wealth creation, income and wealth distribution 
becomes temporarily more unequal before becoming more egalitarian (the Kuznets hypothesis). 
The new wealth is first captured by those who are primarily responsible for its creation and better 
equipped or have better competencies to thrive in the new technological environment. The 
restructuring and reorganization of economic activities and the more widespread acquisition of 
newly valued skills increase productivity and favor less unequal distribution. We may have reached 
the peak of income and wealth inequality in western countries. A non-random group of economists 
surveyed by Alan Kruger in the mid-1990s named technological change as the main factor of 
income polarization followed by “unknown” and globalization.33    
                                                           
32 William Watson (2015), The Inequality Trap: Fighting Capitalism instead of Poverty, University of Toronto Press, 
Toronto. 
33 As reported by Chrystia Freeland (2012), Plutocrats: The Rise of the New Global Super-Rich and the Fall of 
Everyone Else, Doubleday Canada. 
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There is a level of inequality in the distribution of income or wealth that enhances the well-being 
of all by contributing to three related incentive-based social needs or imperatives: first, the need to 
ensure a proper level of savings and investments; second, the need to allow and induce a proper 
level of creative destruction through creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship; and third, the need 
to induce the proper but individually costly development and acquisition of new competencies. 
Those imperatives may be the most important determinants of gains in social well-being.  
The redistribution of income and wealth can only be done in an effective and sustainable way by 
adapting the skills portfolio of individuals in order to increase their contribution to their fellow 
citizens’ wellbeing and therefore their own value on labor markets at all levels. It is through 
institutions and mechanisms for the continuous, rapid and orderly adaptation of skills portfolios 
that individuals, their institutions and their governments can at best combine income generation 
and wealth creation with responsible redistribution. The best way to redistribute income and wealth 
is to promote everyone's participation in their generation and creation. 
And the most significant socially relevant inequality is the inequality of consumption. Although 
data are not available for a long history, we have seen that consumption inequality has significantly 
decreased in Canada and most probably around the world over the last two decades and most 
probably much more.  
As mentioned by Amartya Sen (2001)34, “Pervasive poverty and lives that were "nasty, brutish and 
short," as Thomas Hobbes put it, dominated the world not many centuries ago, with only a few 
pockets of rare affluence. In overcoming that penury, modern technology as well as economic 
interrelations have been influential. The predicament of the poor across the world cannot be 
reversed by withholding from them the great advantages of contemporary technology, the well-
established efficiency of international trade and exchange, and the social as well as economic 
merits of living in open, rather than closed, societies. What is needed is a fairer distribution of the 
fruits of globalization.” 
 
 
                                                           
34 Amartya Sen (2001), “If It's Fair, It's Good: 10 Truths About Globalization,” International Herald Tribune, July 
14, 2001. 
